"La desfiguración es la forma que adoptan las cosas en el olvido", dice Walter Benjamin en su famoso ensayo sobre Franz Kafka. El mundo de la desfiguración alberga todo aquello que, excluido del orden social y lingüístico y olvidado por nosotros, ha sido desechado como inútil, sobrante, inclasificable y que, sin embargo, sobrevive al orden intencionado y orientado a objetivos. Este residuo, precisamente porque no se puede conceptualizar, siempre ha producido su propio mundo de imágenes en la literatura, la (...) música, en definitiva, en la imaginación humana. En este artículo, rescato la idea de la desfiguración de Walter Benjamin como clave de interpretación de este círculo de figura. Los habitantes de este mundo de la desfiguración, traviesamente se esconden en los rincones ocultos de nuestro orden doméstico. Son extraños y ajenos, inquietantes como algo que una vez fue nuestro y ahora está excluido. Lo que tienen en común es que se niegan a hablar, que se sustraen al agarre del concepto, que no se les puede inmovilizar, que despiertan culpa y vergüenza y que -quizá porque no viven, sino que a lo sumo sobreviven- no pueden morir. Como revoltosos y fantasmales cambia-formas, no nos dan tregua, exigen atención y desafían nuestro pensamiento, y sugieren que sin ellos no será posible una vida reconciliada. (shrink)

In die Geschichte sind Franz Josef Graf von Thun (1734-1801) und seine Frau Wilhelmine (1744-1800) als Gonner des Geniemusikers Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart eingegangen. Der "sonderbare Cavalier", wie er von Mozart genannt wurde, war seinen Zeitgenossen eher als Geisterbeschworer und Magnetiseur, denn als Musikliebhaber und Schriftsteller bekannt. Erst 2009 tauchte im Familienarchiv Thun-Hohenstein das Manuskript der umfangreichen esoterischen Enzyklopadie auf, in der Graf von Thun seine Ansichten uber den Menschen, uber das Weltall und uber die Franzosische Revolution darlegt. (...) Ivo Cerman stellt hier die Philosophie des Grafen vor dem Hintergrund des Illuminismus des 18. Jahrhunderts vor und ediert die wichtigsten Artikel seiner esoterischen Enzyklopadie. Auf der Grundlage dieser gerade entdeckten wichtigen Quelle kann die Frage nach dem Verhaltnis zwischen Aufklarung und Illuminismus neu beantwortet werden. (shrink)

Jury theorems are mathematical theorems about the ability of collectives to make correct decisions. Several jury theorems carry the optimistic message that, in suitable circumstances, ‘crowds are wise’: many individuals together (using, for instance, majority voting) tend to make good decisions, outperforming fewer or just one individual. Jury theorems form the technical core of epistemic arguments for democracy, and provide probabilistic tools for reasoning about the epistemic quality of collective decisions. The popularity of jury theorems spans across various disciplines such (...) as economics, political science, philosophy, and computer science. This entry reviews and critically assesses a variety of jury theorems. It first discusses Condorcet's initial jury theorem, and then progressively introduces jury theorems with more appropriate premises and conclusions. It explains the philosophical foundations, and relates jury theorems to diversity, deliberation, shared evidence, shared perspectives, and other phenomena. It finally connects jury theorems to their historical background and to democratic theory, social epistemology, and social choice theory. (shrink)

In the emerging literature on judgment aggregation over logically connected proposi- tions, expert rights or liberal rights have not been investigated yet. A group making collective judgments may assign individual members or subgroups with expert know- ledge on, or particularly affected by, certain propositions the right to determine the collective judgment on those propositions. We identify a problem that generalizes Sen's 'liberal paradox'. Under plausible conditions, the assignment of rights to two or more individuals or subgroups is inconsistent with the (...) unanimity principle, whereby unanimously accepted propositions are collectively accepted. The inconsistency can be avoided if individual judgments or rights satisfy special conditions. (shrink)

We give a review and critique of jury theorems from a social-epistemology perspective, covering Condorcet’s (1785) classic theorem and several later refinements and departures. We assess the plausibility of the conclusions and premises featuring in jury theorems and evaluate the potential of such theorems to serve as formal arguments for the ‘wisdom of crowds’. In particular, we argue (i) that there is a fundamental tension between voters’ independence and voters’ competence, hence between the two premises of most jury theorems; (ii) (...) that the (asymptotic) conclusion that ‘huge groups are infallible’, reached by many jury theorems, is an artifact of unjustified premises; and (iii) that the (nonasymptotic) conclusion that ‘larger groups are more reliable’, also reached by many jury theorems, is not an artifact and should be regarded as the more adequate formal rendition of the ‘wisdom of crowds’. (shrink)

'A thorough examination of the nature and value of forgiveness....This book stays close to its subject matter and moves within a tight focus. It is well written and thoroughly researched.'.

People reason not only in beliefs, but also in intentions, preferences, and other attitudes. They form preferences from existing preferences, or intentions from existing beliefs and intentions, and so on. This often involves choosing between rival conclusions. Building on Broome (Rationality through reasoning, Hoboken, Wiley. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118609088, 2013) and Dietrich et al. (J Philos 116:585–614. https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil20191161138, 2019), we present a philosophical and formal analysis of reasoning in attitudes, with or without facing choices in reasoning. We give different accounts of choosing, in (...) terms of a conscious activity or a partly subconscious process. Reasoning in attitudes differs fundamentally from reasoning _about_ attitudes, a form of theoretical reasoning in which one discovers rather than forms attitudes. We show that reasoning in attitudes has standard formal properties (such as monotonicity), but is indeterministic, reflecting choice in reasoning. Like theoretical reasoning, it need not follow logical entailment, but for a more radical reason, namely indeterminism. This makes reasoning in attitudes harder to model logically than theoretical reasoning. But it can be studied abstractly, using indeterministic consequence operators. (shrink)

A probability aggregation rule assigns to each profile of probability functions across a group of individuals (representing their individual probability assignments to some propositions) a collective probability function (representing the group's probability assignment). The rule is “non-manipulable” if no group member can manipulate the collective probability for any proposition in the direction of his or her own probability by misrepresenting his or her probability function (“strategic voting”). We show that, except in trivial cases, no probability aggregation rule satisfying two mild (...) conditions (non-dictatorship and consensus preservation) is non-manipulable. (shrink)

Judgment-aggregation theory has always focused on the attainment of rational collective judgments. But so far, rationality has been understood in static terms: as coherence of judgments at a given time, defined as consistency, completeness, and/or deductive closure. This paper asks whether collective judgments can be dynamically rational, so that they change rationally in response to new information. Formally, a judgment aggregation rule is dynamically rational with respect to a given revision operator if, whenever all individuals revise their judgments in light (...) of some information (a learnt proposition), then the new aggregate judgments are the old ones revised in light of this information, i.e., aggregation and revision commute. We prove an impossibility theorem: if the propositions on the agenda are non-trivially connected, no judgment aggregation rule with standard properties is dynamically rational with respect to any revision operator satisfying some basic conditions on revision. Our theorem is the dynamic-rationality counterpart of some well-known impossibility theorems for static rationality. We also explore how dynamic rationality might be achieved by relaxing some of the conditions on the aggregation rule and/or the revision operator. Notably, premise-based aggregation rules are dynamically rational with respect to so-called premise-based revision operators. (shrink)

The move to patient-centered medical practice is important for providing relevant and sustainable health care. Narrative medicine, for example, suggests that patients should be involved significantly in diagnosis and treatment. In order to understand the meaning of symptoms and interventions, therefore, physicians must enter the life worlds of patients. But physicians face high patient loads and limited time for extended consultations. In current medical practice, then, is narrative medicine possible? We argue that engaging patient perspectives in the medical visit does (...) not necessarily require a lengthy interview. Instead, a new orientation to this process that emphasizes dialogue between practitioners and patients should be considered. In this new model, the purpose of the visit is to communicate successfully and develop a mutual understanding of illness and care. (shrink)

Can a group be an orthodox rational agent? This requires the group's aggregate preferences to follow expected utility (static rationality) and to evolve by Bayesian updating (dynamic rationality). Group rationality is possible, but the only preference aggregation rules which achieve it (and are minimally Paretian and continuous) are the linear-geometric rules, which combine individual values linearly and combine individual beliefs geometrically. Linear-geometric preference aggregation contrasts with classic linear-linear preference aggregation, which combines both values and beliefs linearly, but achieves only static (...) rationality. Our characterisation of linear-geometric preference aggregation has two corollaries: a characterisation of linear aggregation of values (Harsanyi's Theorem) and a characterisation of geometric aggregation of beliefs. (shrink)

Die Frühe Neuzeit hat in den Geschichts- und Kulturwissenschaften ein eigenes Profil gewonnen. Die Buchreihe Frühe Neuzeit dient der Grundlagenforschung in Gestalt von Editionen, Monographien und Sammelbänden. Sie strebt nicht die großräumige Überschau an, die vorschnelle Synthese oder prätentiöse Konstruktion, sondern nimmt den Umweg über die Arbeit am Detail und die Erkundung verschütteter Traditionszusammenhänge. Ein besonderer Akzent liegt auf Untersuchungen, welche die Grenzen der Fachdisziplin überschreiten.

Bewerking van een televisiecursus gehouden voor de Bayerische Rundfunk.

Über medizinische Fragen hat sich Popper nur sehr wenig geäußert. Aber es liegt nahe, seine erkenntnis- und wissenschaftstheoretischen Grundprinzipien auf die Medizin und ihre Methodologie anzuwenden. Auch das Wissen in der Medizin ist zunächst in der Hauptsache nur Vermutungswissen, welches einer ständigen Verbesserung und Korrektur bedarf. Auch in der Medizin passieren Fehler. Die Fehler gilt es zu erkennen, zu analysieren und in Zukunft zu vermeiden. Arzt und Patient wollen Sicherheit – in der Diagnose und in der Therapie. Absolute Sicherheit kann (...) es aber nicht geben. Die kritische Fehleranalyse und die darauf beruhende Fehlerkorrektur helfen allerdings, den Sicherheitsgrad beständig zu steigern. Daraus ergeben sich auch entscheidende Konsequenzen für die medizinische Ethik. (shrink)

A revision of the author's thesis, Vienna, 1978.

This edition of previously unpublished correspondence from the archive of the New York Union Theological Seminary between young Charles Augustus Briggs and his teacher Isaak August Dorner dates from the second half of the 19th century. It offers insight into the transnational idea flow and interconfessional exchange on the understanding of theology. It is supplemented by letters from August Dorner jun. to Charles Briggs and two letters of recommendation that illustrate the density of the enticing web of intellectual relationships.